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INTRODUCTION

In July of 2002, just one in four Americans believed that corporate
executives were honest.' In the wake of the Enron scandal in December of 2001 and the WorldCom bankruptcy in June of 2002, confidence
in corporate America fell to levels below those seen during the Sav1 The Author acknowledges and appreciates the hard work of Sandra Cortes,
Kelly Gibbons, and the Texas Wesleyan Law Review staff, notably, Lorraine Ellis,
Kimberly Dewey, James Johnson, Waheed Khan, Brooke Mixon, Jeffrey Smith, and
William Stevens. A very special thanks goes to the Author's family, especially his
wife, Janette, and his two boys, Charlie and Reagan, for their inspiration and support.
1. CBS News, Poll: Little Faith in Big Biz, July 10, 2002, http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2002/07/10/opinion/polls/main514732.shtml.
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ings and Loan scandals of the 1980s. 2 The American people demanded action, and the United States government delivered in the
form of the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002-popularly known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.3
Sarbanes-Oxley has been called "the most significant change to American corporate governance" since the 1930s.4 Sarbanes-Oxley re-

quires, among other things, CEOs and CFOs to certify the accuracy of
corporate financial filings, or personally face harsh criminal penalties.5

In October of 2003, the United States government indicted its first
test case defendant under Sarbanes-Oxley, former HealthSouth CEO
Richard M. Scrushy.6 In June of 2005, after 20 months rife with racial

and religious posturing and propaganda, the jury rendered a not-guilty
verdict on all 36 counts leveled against Scrushy, including the first
ever Sarbanes-Oxley criminal charges.7
This Note will show that although the Scrushy case was peculiar,
with such peculiarities ranging from a bizarre strategy employed by
the defense to inexplicable miscalculations made by the prosecution,

the Scrushy verdict is emblematic of key flaws in the certification requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley. Namely, that the requirements do not
place ultimate responsibility on the CEO, which is a primary purpose

of the Act.8 This Note will assert that after the almost unparalleled

regulatory shift9 and the billions of dollars spent on compliance by

corporations, 10 Sarbanes-Oxley ultimately does not fulfill one of its
primary mandates. It does not hold corporate executives accountable.
2. Id. The Savings and Loan crisis was caused by rising interest rates, oscillation
in real estate values, lack of regulatory oversight, mismanagement, failed speculation,
and fraud. Over 1,000 savings and loan institutions failed. The final cost of the crisis is
estimated to have totaled $160 billion, about $132 billion of which was paid by the
United States government. See Div. of Research and Statistics, FDIC, HISTORY OF
THE EIGHTIES: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE, 167-69, 172-73, 180, 186-87 (1997), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/167-188.pdf.
3. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
4. Herbert Grubel, Regulators vs. Adam Smith, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2002, at A14.
5. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (Supp. III 2003);
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 906(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (Supp. III 2003).
6. See Indictment, United States v. Scrushy, 366 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (N.D. Ala.
2005) (No. CR-03BE-0530-S), 2003 WL 22002425.
7. Dan Ackman, Crazy in Alabama?, FORBES.COM, June 29, 2005, http://
www.forbes.com/management/2005/06/29/scrushy-healthsouth-fraudcx da 0629topnews.html; John Helyar, Donald Watkins-The Man Who Saved Richard Scrushy, FORTUNE, July 25, 2005, at 26, available at http://money.cnn.com/
magazines/fortune/fortunearchive/2005/07/25/8266621/index.htm.
8. See Kathleen A. Lacey et al., Assessing the Deterrent Effect of the SarbanesOxley Act's CertificationProvisions:A Comparative Analysis Using the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 397, 400 (2005).
9. Grubel, supra note 4.
10. See Larry E. Ribstein, Sarbanes-Oxley After Three Years, (Univ. of I11.Law &
Econ. Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. LE05-016, 2005), available at http://
240
ssrn.com/abstract=840484.
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This Note is divided into three parts. Part I will discuss the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act itself, including an overview of the political
firestorm that motivated its enactment. Part I will also detail the Act's
certification requirement and the penalties for noncompliance. And,
finally, Part I will set the stage for United States v. Scrushy by detailing
the considerable success the Department of Justice had realized in
prosecuting white-collar criminals leading up to Scrushy.
Part II will discuss the background of HealthSouth and Richard
Scrushy. It will illustrate the government's case against Scrushy and
how the government believed the HealthSouth scam was implemented. Part II will also analyze Scrushy's motion that challenged the
constitutionality of Sarbanes-Oxley. Part II will examine the trial itself and will provide a description of three primary reasons Richard
Scrushy was acquitted-Scrushy's home field advantage, his public relations strategy, and the unique courtroom tactics used by his defense.
Finally, Part II will conclude with a look to the future of Richard M.
Scrushy, a man who still faces another criminal case and a myriad of
civil cases against him.
Part III of this note will analyze the impact of the Scrushy verdict.
It will show that even though the Scrushy case was by no means typical, important insights into future Sarbanes-Oxley prosecutions can be
gleaned. It will argue that one of the Act's original purposes-to hold
corporate executives criminally accountable-has failed. Part III will
look to the future of Sarbanes-Oxley. It will provide alternative ideas
to consider in order to more efficiently restore confidence in corporate America, while relaxing restrictions on innovation and risktaking.
II.

THE ENRON FIRESTORM-THE IMPETUS
BEHIND SARBANES-OXLEY

The collapse of Enron was the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history at
the time (later eclipsed by the collapse of WorldCom). 11 It led to
thousands of employees and investors losing their life savings, children's college funds, and pensions. 2 Enron originally developed, constructed, and operated power plants and pipelines in order to
distribute electricity and gas throughout the United States. 3 Enron's
real success, however, came through its groundbreaking marketing of
power commodities and their interrelated by-products as tradable financial instruments.14
11. See Luisa Beltran, WorldCom Files Largest Bankruptcy Ever, CNN MONEY,
July 22, 2002, http://money.cnn.com/2002/07/19/news/worldcom-bankruptcy/.
12. See John P. Lucci, Enron-The Bankruptcy Heard Around the World and the
InternationalRicochet of Sarbanes-Oxley, 67 ALB. L. REV. 211, 211-12 (2003).
13. See C. William Thomas, The Rise and Fall of Enron, J. AcCr., Apr. 2002, at 41,
41-42, available at http://www.aicpa.org/PUBS/jofa/apr2002/thomas.htm.
14. See id. at 43.
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At its height, Enron's stock was valued at over $90 per share.1 5 Enron was listed as "America's Most Innovative Company" by Fortune
magazine for six consecutive years, from 1996 to 2001.16 It was also on
Fortune's "100 Best Companies to Work for in America" list in 2000.17
The crux of the Enron fraud occurred from 1997 to 2001, when En18
ron systematically overstated its profits by more than $580 million.
It created a network of complex offshore partnerships as a means to
veil its massive debt so it could continue to obtain cash and credit to
continue operations.1 9
The Enron fallout was unprecedented. No financial scandal in recent history stimulated the type of public backlash experienced after
Enron. 20 The public outrage was no doubt buoyed by the subsequent
scandals involving other prominent companies such as WorldCom,
Tyco International, Global Crossing, Adelphia Communications, and,
Enron's auditor, Arthur Anderson.2 1
It was Enron, however, that captured the public's attention. Enron's failure went far beyond the fall of one big corporation. Its name
became synonymous with corruption and greed. In 2002, more than
80% of Americans believed that the Enron collapse was important to
the nation. 2a Bruce Nussbaum of Business Week stressed Enron's importance and called for decisive action in early 2002:
Investor confidence is crucial to the success of our economic system.
This confidence is threatened by not only the Enron scandal but by
the dramatic decline in accounting standards. People increasingly
feel the game is rigged. Unless Washington and business professionals seize the moment to clean up the mess in the market economy,
they risk a major populist backlash.2 3
The Enron problem was viewed as a failure of the standards of corporate governance and as a deficiency among corporate officers and directors in their duties to shareholders.2 4 Evidence of this was shown
by the public outrage over Enron CEO Kenneth Lay's and President
Jeffrey Skilling's protestations that they were unaware of Enron's
15. See id. at 42.
16. Press Release, Enron, Enron Named Most Innovative for Sixth Year (Feb. 6,
2001), available at http://www.enron.com/corp/pressroomi/releases/2001 (follow "Enron Named Most Innovative for Sixth Year" hyperlink).
17. Press Release, Enron (Dec. 18, 2000) (on file with author).
18. Lacey et al., supra note 8, at 420.
19. Id. at 415 n.83, 420.
20. See Little Faith in Big Biz, supra note 1.
21. See Lacey, supra note 8, at 401-02, 420.
22. See Poll: Enron Fallout Rising, CBS NEWS, Jan. 26, 2002, http://
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/01/25/opinion/main325699.shtml.
23. Bruce Nussbaum, Can You Trust Anybody Anymore?, Bus. WK., Jan. 28, 2002,
at 30, 31-32, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/content/
0204/b3767701.htm.
24. See Lacey, supra note 8, at 420.
242
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questionable accounting tactics.2 5 The public, however, was not alone
in blaming the upper level officers. Many in the business community
shared their indignation, as evidenced by this statement made by the
Business Roundtable shortly after Enron's bankruptcy: "Senior management is expected to know how the company earns its income and
what risks the company is undertaking in the course of carrying out its
business .... [I]t is the responsibility of management ... to produce
financial statements that fairly present the financial condition of the

company ...

26

Thus, as a result of this mounting pressure, in June of 2002, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) ordered the CEOs or CFOs
of nearly 1,000 companies to certify that their most recent financial
filings were complete and accurate.2 7 The SEC had hoped to reassure
investors that the earnings restatements of Enron and WorldCom
were isolated, and that current reports were accurate. 28 The relevant
officers were required to attest under oath that their current financial
reports were materially truthful, or they were obligated to explain why
the reports were not truthful.29 Despite some due process concerns,
and perhaps due to fear of a public backlash, most corporate officers
filed the requisite documentation.3"
Any due process fears were rendered moot when President Bush
signed Sarbanes-Oxley into law on July 30, 2002, less than a month
after it was introduced by Congress, a mere seven months after the
Enron collapse, and a little over three months before the mid-term
elections. 3 1 To some, it was a sign of bipartisanship at its finest, as
Sarbanes-Oxley passed 99_0.32 To others, it proved the adage, "legislation that passes unanimously generally proves to be bad
legislation."3 3

25. See Julie Mason, Portraitof a Boss Who Was Out of Touch, Hous. CHRON.,
Feb. 20, 2002, at Al, available at http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/special/enron/
1262114.html.
26. Press Release, Business Roundtable, Statement of the Business Roundtable
on Corporate Governance Principles Relating to the Enron Bankruptcy (Feb. 11,
2002), available at http://www.businessroundtable.org//index.aspx (search for "statement relating to Enron bankruptcy"; then follow the resulting hyperlink).
27. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Publishes List of Companies Whose Officers
Are Ordered to Certify Accuracy and Completeness of Recent Annual Reports (June
28, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-96.htm.
28. Lacey, supra note 8, at 421.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 421-22.
31. See Lucci, supra note 12, at 215.
32. 148 CONG. REC. S7365 (daily ed. July 25, 2002).
33. Scott S. Powell, The Folly of Sarbanes-Oxley, HOOVER DIGEST, Spring 2005,
)
http://www.hooverdigest.org/052/powell.html.

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

5

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 13 [2022], Iss. 1, Art. 9

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW
A.

[Vol. 13

The CertificationRequirements of Sarbanes-Oxley

The major implications of United States v. Scrushy on SarbanesOxley, and, therefore, the focus of this Note, are on the Act's certification requirements.3 4 Section 302 of Sarbanes-Oxley requires CEOs
and CFOs of SEC-registered issuers to certify annual and quarterly
reports.3 5 Section 302 certification comes in the form of a declaration
included along with the financial statements, ensuring that those financial statements "fairly present in all material respects the financial
condition.., of the issuer,"36 and that the report "does not contain
any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements ... not misleading. ' 37 In
August of 2002, the SEC amended its rules to implement the certification requirement.3 8 The new SEC rules require that the officer certify
that:
a) he or she reviewed the report
b) based on his or her knowledge the report does not contain any
untrue statement of material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made not misleading
c) the financial statements fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition and results of operations of the issuer
d) he or she is responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures that ensure material information is
made known to them
e) he or she has evaluated the effectiveness of the issuer's disclosure controls within 90 days of the report
f) he or she has disclosed to the issuer's auditors all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls
g) he or she has disclosed any fraud, whether
39 or not material, that
involves management or other employees.
A false certification leaves CEOs and CFOs open to criminal
prosecution. n
B.

Appraisal of Internal Controls Requirement

In addition to the certification requirement, companies are required
to include an appraisal of their internal controls in their annual re34. United States v. Scrushy, No. CR-03-BE-0530-S, 2004 WL 2713262, at *1
(N.D. Ala. Nov. 23, 2004).
35. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a) (Supp. III 2003).
36. Id. § 7241(a)(3).
37. Id. § 7241(a)(2).
38. Press Release, SEC, Commission Approves Rules Implementing Provisions of
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Accelerating Periodic Filings, and Other Measures (Aug. 27,
2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-128.htm.
39. See 15 U.S.C. § 7241.
40. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 906(c), 18 U.S.C. § 1350(c) (Supp. III 2003)244
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ports.4 ' Under the SEC's new rules, a company's annual report must
include:
a statement of management's responsibility for establishing and
maintaining adequate internal control over financial reporting for
the company; management's assessment of the effectiveness of the
company's internal control over financial reporting ... as of the end

of the company's most recent fiscal year; a statement identifying the
framework used by management to evaluate the effectiveness of the
company's internal control over financial reporting; and a statement
that the registered public accounting firm that audited the company's financial statements included in the annual report has issued
an attestation report on management's assessment of the company's
internal control over financial reporting ....

[M]anagement [must]

evaluate any change in the company's internal control over financial
reporting that occurred during a fiscal quarter that has materially
affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the company's
internal control over financial reporting.4 2
One intention of the new certification requirement was to facilitate
the prosecution of CEOs and CFOs. 43 The mandate for directors to

enact and closely monitor internal control systems as part of their duty
of care adds another layer of legal obligation. The government considered internal control systems vital to truthful and dependable financial reporting in today's multifaceted business environment.4 4
There is little doubt that the certification provisions are an attempt
to rehabilitate confidence in the wake of Enron and other corporate
scandals that involved fraud, poor internal controls, and misleading
financial statements. Section 302 is also intended to quell the "I didn't
know" defense so commonly asserted by corporate officers who are
probed by the SEC and the Department of Justice for corporate
fraud.45 Sarbanes-Oxley intended to end CEOs' and CFOs' assertions
that they had no knowledge of fraud within their companies because
they are now required to personally certify the financial documentation.46 The requirement that the company's internal controls must be
established and monitored in order for material information to reach
top management further highlights Congress's desire to put an end to

41. See 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a).
42. Management's Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Exchange Act Release No.
47,986, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,636 (June 18, 2003).
43. See Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William 0. Douglas-The Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Chargeof Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J.

L. 79, 100 (2005).
44. Id. at 103.
45. Christopher Preble, George W. Bush CEO, CATO
www.cato.org/pub-display.php?pub-id=3992.
46. Id.
CORP.

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

INST.,

July 18, 2005, http://

7

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 13 [2022], Iss. 1, Art. 9

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13

the "I didn't know" defense.4 7 But in light of Scrushy's acquittal in
United States v. Scrushy, did Sarbanes-Oxley achieve its goal?
C.

Other Sarbanes-Oxley Pro'visions

Sarbanes-Oxley has many other requirements in addition to certification and assessment of internal controls. These include controversial new regulations of attorneys and accountants involved with
corporate governance, mandated ethics provisions, sweeping new
whistleblower rules, and new executive compensation and loan restrictions.4" Sarbanes-Oxley also adds or increases a number of civil and
criminal penalties for violations of current federal securities laws.4 9
Among other things, Sarbanes-Oxley produces a new federal felony
for securities fraud 50 and two new anti-shredding penalties.5 1 It expands the range of obstruction of justice,52 increases the maximum
prison term for mail and wire fraud, 53 and modifies the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) to increase the
criminal punishment for squandering pensions. 4
Sarbanes-Oxley increases the maximum term of imprisonment from
ten to twenty years and extends the maximum fines from $1 million to
$5 million for infringement of securities laws.55 For anyone other than
a natural person (e.g., corporations), Sarbanes-Oxley boosts the maximum fine from $2.5 million to $25 million.5 6 In addition, SarbanesOxley increases the maximum penalties for many other statutes.5 7 For
mail and wire fraud, Sarbanes-Oxley takes the maximum sentence
from five to twenty years. 58 For violations of ERISA, Sarbanes-Oxley
raises the maximum term in prison from one year to ten years, the
maximum fine from $5,000 to $100,000,
and the maximum fine for cor59
porations from $100,000 to $500,000.
In the three years since their enactment, these beefed up criminal
penalties have had little discernable impact on charges made by federal prosecutors or sentences handed down by federal judges. 60 But in
47. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(4)-(5) (Supp. III
2003).
48. Karmel, supra note 43, at 103, 106, 113, 117.
49. Id. at 129.
50. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 807, 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (Supp. III 2003).
51. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1519, 1520.
52. Id. § 1512.
53. See id. § 1341, 1343.
54. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 904, 29 U.S.C. § 1131 (2002).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a).
56. Id.
57. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
58. Id.
59. 29 U.S.C. § 1131.
60. See Jay K. Musoff & Brian H. Newman, White-Collar Crime: Criminal Provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley Have Yet To Make an Impact, N.Y. L.J., July 19, 2004, http://
www.orrick.com/fileupload/333.pdf.
246
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the wake of Blakely v. Washington,6 1 in which the United States Supreme Court cast a shadow over the U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the Sarbanes-Oxley statutory increases may become more
important.6 2 Under the guidelines, the impacts of maximum increases
were negligible because most serious fraud charges could be "stacked"
in order to meet the total sentence required by the guidelines.6 3 But
with consistent use of the guidelines now in doubt, the statutory maximum increases created by Sarbanes-Oxley could take on a more
prominent role.64
D.

The Government's Success Leading up to
United States v. Scrushy

Prior to the Scrushy verdict, prosecutors were faring quite well in
high-profile, white-collar crime cases, even without the aid of
Sarbanes-Oxley. 65 In May of 2004, Frank Quattrone of Credit Suisse
First Boston was convicted of obstruction of justice and was sentenced
to 18 months in prison.6 6 In July of 2004, Adelphia Communications
Corp. founder John Rigas was convicted of conspiracy, bank fraud,
and securities fraud. 67 In October of 2004, Martha Stewart was convicted in federal court of conspiracy, obstruction of justice, and making false statements related to a personal sale of stock. 68 Bernie
for his part in
Ebbers, former CEO of WorldCom, Inc., was convicted
69
the WorldCom $11 billion accounting scandal.
61. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
62. See Musoff & Newman, supra note 60.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See Status of High-Profile Corporate Scandals, USA TODAY.COM, June 17,
2005, http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/2005-06-17-corporate-scandals-statusx.htm.
66. Id. Through Credit Suisse, Quattrone took internet companies public during
the dot-corn stock boom of the 1990s. Id. He was convicted after his initial trial
ended in a hung jury. Id. His conviction is being appealed. Id.
67. Id. John Rigas, who founded Adelphia Communications Corp., was convicted
and sentenced to 15 years in prison for bank fraud, securities fraud, and conspiracy.
Id. When his attorney suggested that Rigas had done these things for the betterment
of the small town of Coudersport, Pa., where Rigas had founded the company decades earlier, U.S. District Judge Leonard Sand noted, "To be a great philanthropist
with other people's money really is not very persuasive." See David Gloven & David
Voreacos, Adelphia FounderJohn Rigas Gets 15 Years; Son 20, June 20, 2005, http:I/
www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000087&refer=top-world-news&sid=aJwBj
EqxRfXM.
68. Status of High-ProfileCorporate Scandals, supra note 65. Stewart was released
to five months of home confinement in March 2005 after serving five months in
prison. Id. Stewart's former Merrill Lynch broker, Peter Bacanovic, also served a
five-month sentence and five months of home confinement. Id.
69. Id. Like the case against Richard Scrushy, the case against Ebbers was primarily based on the testimony of a former CFO. Id.
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HEALTHSOUTH AND THE CASE AGAINST

RICHARD M. SCRUSHY

Richard Scrushy, a former respiratory therapist, built his healthcare empire from the ground up.7" In 1985, Scrushy started HealthSouth Corporation with very little money in a one-room office
equipped with only one phone.71 By 2003, the company was operating
1,800 health-care facilities in 50 states and was treating nearly 100,000
patients every day.7 2 Before 2003, HealthSouth was well-known for
the treatment of orthopedic, sports-related, closed-head, spinal, and
other neurological and physical injuries.7 3 After 2003, it became
known for fraud and scandal.
The government contended that Scrushy and other HealthSouth officials falsified almost $3 billion in profits. 4 The government asserted
that every quarter Scrushy would require HealthSouth senior officials
to perform an analysis of the company's earnings in relation to Wall
Street expectations. 75 If the earnings fell short, Scrushy would demand that subordinates "fix it" by fabricating earnings reports.7 6 The
actual earnings manipulations were conducted by senior accountants
during sessions they called "family meetings,"
and participants in the
77
meetings were known as "family members.
One of the most frequent ways in which "family members" manipulated earnings was by reducing the contractual adjustment account.78
The contractual adjustment account approximates the difference between the amount billed to the patient and the amount insurance will
cover. 79 That estimate played an important role in determining
HealthSouth's net revenues and was very difficult to substantiate.8 0
The "family" also had to adjust the balance sheet in order to reconcile
any increases in revenue or decreases in expenses with increases or
decreases in assets or liabilities.8 1 HealthSouth insiders also falsified
fixed-asset accounts so they would correspond with the fictitious modifications of the income statement.8 2 Another popular avenue used by
HealthSouth accountants to "fix it" was to make false asset entries
70. CBS News, Cooking the Books: Scrushy Appears in Only Interview Since
Securites Fraud Scandal, Aug. 22, 2004, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/1O/08/
60minutes/main577217.shtml.
71. See id.
72. Id.
73. See id.
74. Id.
75. Complaint at 5, SEC v. Scrushy, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (N.D. Ala. 2003) (No.
CV-03-J-0615-S), 2003 WL 22002425.
76. See id.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 6.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
2d
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into the company's property, plant, and equipment accounts (PP&E),
which artificially inflated assets.8 3
In an effort to conceal their fraudulent maneuvers, HealthSouth accountants were careful.8 4 Because they knew that auditors would notice large increases in the PP&E accounts, they kept the fraudulent
additions below a discernable level.8 5 They also produced sham86 invoices and other related documents in efforts to mask their fraud. If
inventories were increased to prop up earnings, accountants would increase inventory accounts in PP&E accounts by varying amounts to
keep auditors from becoming suspicious. 8 7 The government stated
that by mid-2002, HealthSouth had overstated its PP&E account by $1
billion, its cash accounts by $300 million, and its total assets in excess
of $1.5 billion.88
The Scrushy defense maintained that members of "the family" were
a group of rogue executives who perpetrated the fraud on their own
without Mr. Scrushy's knowledge.8 9 In the eight-month investigation
leading up to charges being filed against Scrushy, 15 former top executives entered guilty pleas. Included in the snared group were five former CFOs of HealthSouth-Aaron Beam, Michael Martin, Tadd
McVay, Weston Smith, and Bill Owens.9" Owens wore a wire for the
government and recorded conversations with Scrushy,91and was called
"the Don of the family" by Scrushy defense lawyers.
A.

Scrushy's Pre-trialStrategy

The power of public perception was not lost on Richard Scrushy.
The fact that Federal Prosecutor Alice Martin decided to hold the trial
in Birmingham, Alabama made Scrushy's public image all the more
important and malleable.9" Contrary to post-verdict commentary, after news of the fraud was released, Scrushy was not a universally popular figure in the Birmingham community. 93 Like former Enron CEO
Ken Lay in Houston, the malfeasance of the company over which
83. Id.
84. Id. at 7.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 5
89. See Greg Farrell, Scrushy Trial: Too Close to Call, USA TODAY, May 18, 2005,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/health/2005-05-17-scrushyusat x.htm?csp=N009.
90. HealthSouth Dragnet, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, http://www.al.com/specialreport/
birminghamnews/healthsouth/guilty.jpg (last visited Sept. 11, 2006).
91. Id.
92. See Greg Farrell, Against the Odds, Scrushy Walks Out of Court Free Man,
USA TODAY, June 28, 2005, at 1B, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/health/2005-06-28-scrushy-cover-usat x.htm.
2
93. See Cooking the Books, supra note 70.
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Scrushy presided cost a lot of people a lot of money.9 4 Scrushy took
aggressive steps to improve his image, at least with respect to specific
segments of the Birmingham population.95
Before he was indicted on multiple counts by federal prosecutors,
Richard Scrushy attended church in Vestavia Hills, Alabama, the wellheeled suburb where he lived.9 6 But after the indictment, Scrushy
started attending the Guiding Light Church, a ministry that mainly
serves African-Americans living in a blue-collar neighborhood of Birmingham.9 7 In early 2004, Guiding Light Church purchased a year's
worth of airtime for a cable-television show to be aired in Birmingham.9 8 In March of 2004, Scrushy and his wife, Leslie, began hosting
the thirty-minute talk show every weekday morning. 99 The religious
show, Viewpoint, primarily featured guests who were Birmingham
ministers and pastors. 10 0 An estimated five-thousand people watched
the program each day. 0 1
10 2
Scrushy's critics considered the show a cheap jury selection tactic.
But others were not so critical. Arthur Andersen attorney Rusty Hardin stated that sometimes a defendant must use atypical means to
counteract prosecutors.10 3 He stated, "I don't automatically disagree
with people who decide to use the media.... The dilemma for somebody like Scrushy is that the government uses official press conferences to create an impression of people that they're powerless to
counteract unless they do something in response." ' 4
Scrushy, of course, denied that the show was any type of strategic
maneuver.1 0 5 Instead, his spokesman claimed that the show was
merely a venue for community service and a way to provide "uplifting
programming while providing access to pastors and others performing
essential services in the community which could not find a voice on
ordinary commercial television. ' 10 6 It is also worth noting that the
show's main sponsor was Alamerica Bank. The Chairman of that
bank, and the star of the10 7commercial, was Donald Watkins-head of
Scrushy's defense team.
94. See id.
95. See Helyar, supra note 7, at 26.
96. Greg Farrell, FormerHealthSouth CEO Scrushy Turns Televangelist, USA ToDAY, Oct. 25, 2004, at 1B, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/
health/2004-10-25-scrushy-coverx.htm.
97. Id.
98. Id.

99. Id.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Scrushy's Challenges to the Constitutionality of Sarbanes-Oxley

Before trial, the Scrushy defense team filed a barrage of motions. 10 8
Included in these motions was a challenge to the constitutionality of
Sarbanes-Oxley. 0 9 Because Scrushy was the test case of SarbanesOxley, the constitutional challenge was one of first impression. 110
Scrushy asserted that the certification provisions of the Act were so
vague as to be facially unconstitutional."' More specifically, Scrushy
challenged the provisions requiring "'fairly presents, in all material
respects,' in subsection 1350(b), and 'willfully certifies' in [subsection]
1350(c)(2)." 1 2 The Scrushy defense team argued that the phrases
"fairly presents" and "in all material respects" were not clear enough
to properly notify citizens of their responsibility under the law and,
therefore, did not pass constitutional muster." 3 Scrushy also argued
that the phrase "willfully certifies" failed to define an illegal act and,
therefore, was unconstitutional." 4
The court dismissed Scrushy's motion. 1 5 Judge Karon Bowdre
found the statute clear.' 6 She held:
[E]ach requirement for compliance and for imposition of criminal
penalties for failure to comply is laid out step by step on the face of
the statute. Subsection (a) requires a CEO to make a written statement to accompany the company's periodic financial report required by other Securities Exchange Act provisions. Subsection (b)
defines the content of the statement, requiring the CEO certify that
the report complies with the applicable Securities Exchange Act
provisions and "fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the issuer [company or corporation]." Subsection (c) provides the criminal penalties for violating
7
the statute and describes the conduct required for conviction."
According to Judge Bowdre, the phrases "fairly presents," "material respects," and "willfully certifies" were not static concepts that
could be defined statutorily in an all-encompassing fashion." 8 She
stated that "[t]he meanings of these concepts necessarily flow with the
requirements of the particular statute, the conduct sought to be deterred, the circumstances of the defendant's conduct, and the defendant's conduct in relation to these factors.""' 9 For example, Judge
108. United States v. Scrushy, 366 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (N.D. Ala. 2005).
109. United States v. Scrushy, No. CR-03-BE-0530-S, 2004 WL 2713262, at *1
(N.D. Ala. Nov. 23, 2004).
110. Id.
111. Id. at *2.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at *6.
116. Id. at *5.
117. Id. at *4 (footnote omitted).
118. Id. at *3.
119. Id.
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Bowdre stated that "[t]o be considered material, the misrepresentation or omission must significantly alter the total mix of information
produced and made available."' / She found this to be clearly established in case law.12 1 Similarly, Judge Bowdre determined that the
phrase "fairly presenting" was not an original concept in business or in
Judge Bowdre recounted that the phrase has been used for
the law.'
many years by auditors and accountants pertaining to the preparation
of financial statements. 1 23 Judge Bowdre also held that the term "willful" had an extensive tradition in the law. 124 Therefore, the court held
that the statute is "sufficiently definite as to give a person of ordinary
intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden,
and specific enough to prevent arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement under12 6its terms.' 1 5 Thus, she denied Scrushy's constitutional
challenges.
C.

The Trial-Why Did Scrushy Win?

The Washington Post analyzed the verdict this way:
God works in mysterious ways, but his or her decision to acquit
Richard Scrushy .. .on all charges of financial fraud is especially
inscrutable. Five consecutive HealthSouth chief financial officers
admitted to cooking the books and copped a plea. They all fingered
Scrushy. But jurors chose to believe that the man on top knew
nothing about what was going on directly below him.... Only one
word can describe Scrushy's acquittal. It is a miracle.' 27
The New York Times had a similar take:
If ever a chief executive seemed destined for prison, it was Richard
M. Scrushy. Mr. Scrushy has always maintained his innocence. But
at his trial, no one disputed that there was a staggering $2.7 billion
accounting fraud at HealthSouth, the company he helped found in
1984. Federal prosecutors lined up many former executives, including five former chief financial officers, to testify that Mr. Scrushy
orchestrated the wrongdoing. In court, they played a secret taperecording that seemed to incriminate him. Jurors, who heard from
dozens of witnesses but never the man himself, agreed with Mr.
Scrushy-to the surprise of many lawyers watching the case. "It's a
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id at *5.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Michael Kinsley, Editorial, The Lord and Richard Scrushy, WASH. POST, July
3, 2005, at B07, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
252
2005/07/01/AR2005070101819.html.
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stunner, given how strong the government's case
1 28 seemed to be,"
said Gregory J. Wallance, a former prosecutor.
Many in the mainstream press concluded that the Scrushy verdict
was a miracle or a stunner that was unable to be discerned. There
were, however, three concrete reasons for the Scrushy verdict: the first
was the gross miscalculation by the prosecution to hold the trial in
Birmingham; the second was the remarkable public relations campaign implemented by the Scrushy defense team; and the third was
the unique courtroom tactics used by the defense. The following section will analyze each.
1. Home Field Advantage
Perhaps the main reason Richard Scrushy is not in prison is because
the prosecution decided to try the case in Alabama, rather than in
New York. 1 29 The general rule is that for white-collar-crime cases the
government is better served by trying cases in New York.130 The government's advantage in New York can be attributed to a number of
reasons.'3 1 First, prosecutors in New York are very experienced in
handling securities fraud cases. 132 New York has been the setting for
most of the government's recent white-collar-crime victories.1 33 Former WorldCom CEO Bernard Ebbers, former Adelphia CEO John
Rigas, former Credit Suisse First Boston banker Frank Quattrone, and
Martha Stewart were all convicted in New York.1'3 And it is not just
federal juries who convict in New York; a New York
state court jury
135
convicted Former Tyco CEO Dennis Kozlowski.
Another prominent reason for the government's success in New
York is the typical composition of a jury there. 36 The Department of
Justice's success in New York is not because New York juries are adverse to business. 1 37 The government's success there is more attributable to the fact that a New York jury will typically include at least one
member who has a business background
and who can understand the
38
often complex subject matter.'
128. Reed Abelson & Jonathan Glater, Corporate Conduct: The Fallout; A Style
That Connected With Hometown Jurors, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2005, at C1.
129. See Melissa Davis, Scrushy Gets Walk, June 28, 2005, http://
www.thestreet.com/pf/stocks/melissadavid/10230009.html
(quoting Andrew
Stoltmann, Professor at Northwestern University School of Law).
130. Farrell, supra note 92.
131. See id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See id.
138. See id.
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There is a sense that southern juries and even the judicial establish1 39
ment in the south can be distrustful of the federal government.
Judge Karon Bowdre, who presided over the Scrushy trial, was observed to side with the defense frequently during the trial and in her
rulings on motions leading up to trial. 4 ' But the favorable rulings for
Scrushy in Alabama were not limited to those made by Judge Bowdre.
In 2003, U.S. District Judge Inge Johnson denied a motion made by
prosecutors to freeze Scrushy's assets.'4 1 In 2004, Judge U.W. Clemon
gave many of the government's chief witnesses against Scrushy light
sentences-even lighter than those recommended by the prosecution. 142 Judge Clemon issued the sentences, despite the fact that the
witnesses had not yet testified against Scrushy. 143 This allowed the
defense to question the witnesses' credibility to the jury by pointing
out the witnesses' interests in testifying in order to receive reduced
prison time. 4 4 According to lead prosecution attorney Alice Martin,
who conducted post-trial interviews with many jury members, the
light sentences did indeed undermine the credibility of the cooperating witnesses according to answers provided by those jury members. 4 5
Perhaps the most detrimental of the Alabama rulings to the prosecution's case and to Sarbanes-Oxley came in the form of Judge Bowdre's jury instructions.' 46 In Martin's post-trial interview with jury
members, the jury instructions were cited as a major reason for
Scrushy's acquittal.1 47 Sarbanes-Oxley mandates that CEOs certify
their company's annual and quarterly reports.14 8 But in addition to
requiring the certification of the report's truthfulness, Sarbanes-Oxley
also mandates that CEOs include an appraisal of their company's internal controls in their annual reports.14 9 This was intended to eliminate the "I didn't know" defense. 150 The internal controls
requirement was Congress's way of telling CEOs that they had to
know what was taking place within their corporations, and that not
5
knowing or being kept in the dark was no longer a defense.' '
Judge Bowdre's jury instructions made the internal controls certification utterly toothless. Judge Bowdre's recurring admonition to the
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (Supp. II 2002).
149. Id.
150. See Trip Mackintosh & Dick Clayton, Corporate Governance:Avoiding Criminal Liability Under Sarbanes-Oxley, http://www.hollandhart.com/articles/
SarbanesOxleyActof2002.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2006).
151. Id.
254
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jury was that no one could know what was going on in Scrushy's mind
and that only the jury could decide if Scrushy was aware of the fraud
and participated in the fraud. 5 2 One jury member, Curtis Bender,
stated that he entered into the trial suspecting that Scrushy was guilty
of violating Sarbanes-Oxley. He stated, "if he signed that paper,
knowingly or not knowingly, I was thinking he was guilty; [he is] the
CEO of the company. ' 153 But Bender said that once he got into
Judge Bowdre's courtroom, he realized that his original theory was off
the mark.' 54
According to the jury instructions, the internal controls certification
at HealthSouth was not indicative of Scrushy's awareness. 55 Furthermore, the corroboration of a former HealthSouth treasurer, Leif Murphy, who was not implicated in the fraud, did not convince the jury
that Scrushy was aware of the fraud, either. 156 Leif Murphy discovered the fraud and told Scrushy about it. a57 He testified that Scrushy
exploded in rage at him. 158 But in Birmingham, even the testimony of
a witness whose credibility was not in question did not incriminate
Scrushy. The "I didn't know" defense was alive and well in
Alabama. 59
Much can be learned by contrasting the trials of Richard Scrushy
and Bernard Ebbers. Of all the government's recent successes, the
case of former WorldCom CEO Bernard Ebbers, is probably the most
similar to Scrushy, even though Ebbers was not tried under SarbanesOxley. 16 0 In the Ebbers trial, only one highly placed witness testified
that he had discussions with Ebbers regarding illegal conduct. 6 ' Ebbers was subsequently convicted. The Scrushy prosecution presented
five high level witnesses who claimed to have had such conversations
with the HealthSouth CEO.16 2 The government even had taped conversations between Scrushy and one of his CFOs. 16 3 The difference
between the two cases could likely be the difference between Birmingham, Alabama and New York City, New York. When asked of
the decision to hold the trial in Alabama, U.S. attorney Alice Martin
said, "[Y]ou can't run to New York with everything.'1 64 This Note
poses the question, "Why not?"
152.
153.
at C5,
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Farrell, supra note 92.
Kyle Whitmire, Jury Doubted Scrushy's Colleagues, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2005,
available at 2005 WLNR 10415681.
Id.
See id.
See Farrell, supra note 89.
See id.
Id.
See id.
Ackman, supra note 7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Helyar, supra note 7, at 26.
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The Public Relations Campaign

Scrushy's unusual public relations campaign is another reason for
his not guilty verdict. As was mentioned in section 111-A, which details Scrushy's pretrial strategy, prior to his trial Richard Scrushy engrossed himself and his money in various African-American churches
around Birmingham.1 65 He starred in his own television show. 1 66 He
also donated millions of dollars to schools, libraries, and other institutions throughout the area. 6 7 He even agreed to an interview with
and risky tactic for a
Mike Wallace for 60 Minutes-a controversial
168
CEO accused of a multi-million dollar fraud.
Scrushy's public relations campaign focused on the African-American religious community. 169 He attended a new African-American
church, at least partially targeted his television show to that demographic, and hired a local black attorney, Donald Watkins, to head his
defense team, despite the fact that Watkins had not tried a case since
1998.170 Before the trial, Donald Watkins was busy founding a bank,
investing in energy deals, and trying unsuccessfully to buy the
Anaheim Angels baseball team.1 71 Watkins was the son of a university president and one of the first African-Americans to graduate from
the University of Alabama School of Law. Watkins understood how
important race is in Alabama. While many were aware of the racial
implications that are still prevalent in that part of the country, what
possibly only Donald Watkins knew was that he could play the race
card to favor a white, middle-aged, multi-millionaire.
Watkins' ingenious, albeit controversial, strategy was based upon
his belief that in Birmingham, blacks and whites have vastly different
worldviews.1 72 Watkins said, "Black people are more open to receiving their information in the courtroom. Whites will buy into the media hype put out by the U.S. Attorney and Justice Department
....
"'17
Be that as it may, Watkins certainly applied a full media blitz
outside the courtroom, and it paid off. 17 4 Scrushy's son-in-law decided
to buy a television station during the trial.17 5 That television station
176
broadcast reports on a daily basis that promoted Scrushy's side.
Commenting on the television station, Watkins said, "We recognized
that the court of public opinion was just as vital to Scrushy's life and
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Farrell, supra note 92.
Id.
Id.
See Cooking the Books, supra note 70.
See Helyar, supra note 7, at 26.
Id.; see Farrell, supra note 92.
Helyar, supra note 7, at 26.
Id.
Id.
See Farrell, supra note 92.
Id.
Id.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol13/iss1/9
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V13.I1.8

18

Stock: United States v. Scrushy and Its Impact on Criminal Prosecutions

2006] THE IMPACT OF SCRUSHY ON SARBANES-OXLEY

257

freedom as the court of law is.... We made sure we kept the public
educated, as well as the jury. "177
Another facet of the defense's public relations strategy was to have
a strong presence in the courtroom each day, showing support for
Scrushy.178 Many of the preachers who appeared on Scrushy's television show attended trial each day, along with many members of their
congregations, and sat behind the defense table. 179 This group became known as "amen corner. '1 80 Critics pointed to "amen corner"
as yet another ploy to influence jurors, but Watkins insisted that it was
merely an "unbidden show of support."'1 8 ' Courtroom theatrics became a sport for trial observers. Stories of unusual displays became
routine. 182 One such story occurred just prior to the playing of
secretly recorded conversations between Scrushy and his chief accuser, former HealthSouth CFO Bill Owens, a pivotal point in the
trial.18 3 That day, amen corner welcomed a new member, Scrushy's
three-year-old daughter, Gracie Beth.1 8 1 USA Today described the
event:
Tagging along beside her mom, the adorable little girl in pigtails
plopped herself down on the first bench behind the defense table.
Within a few minutes, five African-American men and women of
faith joined hands with Richard and Leslie and formed a circle, with
Gracie Beth in the middle. One member of the group read a passage from the Book of Job, the Old Testament story of a devout
man put through excruciating trials by God. Their heads bowed,
members of the group
prayed, and Gracie Beth chirped in a few
1 85
words at the end.
Larry Soderquist, director of the Corporate and Securities Law Institute at Vanderbilt University, expressed the feelings of many regarding the decision to try the case in Scrushy's hometown and the
impact of Scrushy's African-American support:
There was a mass of evidence against him. I certainly expected the
jury to convict. I thought the prosecution could get a fair hearing in
Birmingham, but that appears not to be the case.... I believe [the
verdict] was because of [Scrushy's] very high reputation in the African-American community, and the fact the jury ended up more than
177. Id.
178. See Greg Farrell, Theatrics, Faith and the Law, USA TODAY, May 23, 2005, at
6B, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/health/2005-05-22scrushy-notebookx.htm.
179. See id.
180. Helyar, supra note 7, at 26.
181. Id.
182. See Farrell, supra note 178.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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. I fear the race card explains the

verdict.

3.

Courtroom Tactics

When the government can present five former CFOs testifying
against the defendant, conventional wisdom supports the prospect of a
conviction, especially considering the recent conviction of Bernard
Ebbers based on the direct testimony of just one former CFO.18 7 But
the courtroom tactics employed by the defense proved conventional
wisdom wrong. The defense's brilliant strategy of discrediting the former CFOs and utilizing constant objections proved to be quite
formidable.
a. Discrediting the CFOs
The defense team considered it vital to morph all five former CFOs
into one figure. 188 The defense knew that the testimony of five CFOs
would be a tough hurdle to overcome, so it successfully fused all five
CFOs into an amalgamation embodied by the most recent CFO, Bill
Owens.18 9 The defense was able to boil the case down to a contest of
credibility between Scrushy and Owens.1 90 Scrushy's team undermined Owens's credibility by pointing out that he failed to file tax
returns for nine years and transferred his assets just prior to agreeing
to aid the government.1 91 In addition, the defense effectively portrayed Owens as arrogant by managing to get Owens to admit to making a peculiar toast at his wife's 40th birthday party. 192 Owens
testified that during the toast, he called himself "the smartest man in
the world."'

93

The defense asked the jury what type of man would

slight his spouse like that at her own birthday party. 194 In a contest
between the self-professed "smartest man in the world" and the philanthropic Scrushy, who was supported by many of Birmingham's most
prominent religious leaders, the choice became clear.
b.

Unorthodox use of Objections

One of the primary reasons the defense was able to portray the
CFOs as disreputable was the unconventional strategy of utilizing
186. Jay Reeves, U.S. Jury Acquits Scrushy on All Counts in Fraud Case, THE
(Columbia, S.C.), June 29, 2005, at B8, available at 2005 WLNR 22968793.
187. Ackman, supra note 7.
188. Farrell, supra note 92.
189. Id.
190. See id.
191. See Advice to DeLay From Scrushy Lawyer: Chin Up, CORP. CRIME REP.
39(1), Oct. 4, 2005, available at http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/
scrushyl00405.htm [hereinafter Advice to DeLay].
192. Farrell, supra note 178.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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steady and consistent objections throughout the trial.' 9 5 Defense attorney Art Leach's constant objections made it very difficult for the
prosecution to gain any momentum. 19 6 This tactic, like so many the
defense team employed, goes against conventional wisdom.' 9 7 Conventional wisdom says to avoid objecting if possible; otherwise, you
98
risk giving the jury the impression that you have something to hide.'
The defense believed, however, that if the objections were appropriately made, and if most of them were sustained, the jury eventually
would become desensitized to them and perhaps even come to believe
that constant objections are par for the course.1 9 9
One other benefit to a steady stream of objections is that it forces
the opposition's hand. °0 When put to the fire, the prosecution had a
hard time avoiding leading questions.2 0 ' For instance, Leach routinely
interrupted one prosecutor with objections to his constant use of leading questions.20 2 The judge almost universally sustained the objections, and the prosecutor was unable to respond without using more
leading questions.20 3 This tactic not only disrupted the government's
momentum, but it also irritated the judge, prompting Judge Bowdre to
chastise the prosecutor in front of the jury. 20 4 This took place a number of times and was yet another example of the defense's exceptional
courtroom strategy.20 5 Thus, the combination of the defense's courtroom tactics, its remarkable public relations campaign, and the prosecution's decision to hold the trial in Alabama are all valid reasons for
Scrushy's acquittal. It is now necessary to analyze the impact of the
not guilty verdict in the government's first test case under SarbanesOxley.
IV.

IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. SCRUSHY

United States v. Scrushy has obviously had a significant impact on
the defendant, Richard Scrushy. But it has also shed new light on
Sarbanes-Oxley. This new light provides meaningful insight into future prosecutions under the law and allows a better evaluation of the
law's overall effectiveness. The following will discuss each.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

See
See
Id.
Id.
See
See
See
Id.
See

Advice to DeLay, supra note 191.
id.

id.
id.
id.
id.

204. Id.
205. See id.
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United States v. Scrushy's Impact on Richard Scrushy

Richard Scrushy still faces a number of civil suits, 77 at last count.2 " 6
Because the burden of proof is less in civil cases, it is conceivable that
Scrushy will be in court around the country for years to come. 0 7 In
January of 2006, a judge ordered Scrushy to pay back to HealthSouth
nearly $48 million dollars in bonuses he received while running the
company, despite his acquittal in federal court.20 8 Scrushy will appeal
that decision.20 9 On December 16, 2005, Scrushy filed suit against
HealthSouth for more than $70 million dollars in damages for what he
says was a breach of contract stemming from his firing in March of
2003.1 He is also seeking to recover legal expenses.2 11 Scrushy is
also suing the Birmingham News and Alabama sports columnist Paul
Finebaum for defamation. 2
Scrushy's main challenge is his appeal from his June of 2006 conviction on federal corruption charges.2 13 Scrushy was convicted of bribery, conspiracy, and mail fraud. 214 The government claims that
Scrushy made "two disguised payments" totaling $500,000 to Alabama
Governor Don Siegelman (who was also convicted) in exchange for
Siegelman appointing him to the state's Certificate of Need Review
Board, which determines hospital expansion plans.21 5 The government also contended that both Scrushy and the Governor exerted improper influence over the board.2 1 6
Aside from his legal troubles, Richard Scrushy is in negotiations to
bring his story to the silver screen.21 7 In September of 2005, Scrushy's
lawyers met in Hollywood with actor James Woods and film producer
Todd Slater to produce the story that Scrushy lawyer Donald Watkins
called "a David versus Goliath story, and a tale of seemingly divergent
personalities coming together to win the battle nobody said could be
206. Kelli M. Dugan, Scrushy Walks: The Aftermath, BIRMINGHAM Bus. J., July 1,
2005, http://birmingham.bizjournals.com/birmingham/stories/2005/07/04/storyl.html.
207. Id.
208. Jay Reeves, Scrushy Ordered to Repay $47.8M in Bonuses, ABC NEWS.COM,
Jan. 4, 2006, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=1470289&page=l.
209. Id.
210. Kyle Whitmire, Scrushy Sues HealthSouth Over Dismissal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
17, 2005, at C4, available at 2005 WLNR 20368083.
211. Id.
212. Eddie Curran, Scrushy Sues Paul Finebaum, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Dec. 22,
2005, at Al, available at 2005 WLNR 22106522.
213. Scrushy, Siegelman Found Guilty on Federal Conspiracy,Bribery Charges,BIRMINGHAM Bus. J., June 29, 2006, http://birmingham.bizjournals.com/birmingham/stories/2006/06/26/daily20.html.
214. Id.
215. Phillip Rawls, Jury Indicts Siegelman, Scrushy, ABC NEWS.COM, Dec. 12, 2005,
http://abcnews.go.com[US/wireStory?id=1399951.
216. Id.
217. Russell Hubbard, Scrushy Movie Deal in Negotiations, His Lawyers Say, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Sept. 16, 2005, at 1A.
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won." 2 18 Scrushy commented that he did not know who should porbut that he thought it should "probably be a nice-lookin'
tray him,
219
fellow.,

B.

United States v. Scrushy's Impact on
the Future of Sarbanes-Oxley

One of the primary purposes behind Sarbanes-Oxley was to force
CEOs and CFOs to attest in writing to their company's financial statements.2 2 ° What many commentators had feared, and what the
Scrushy verdict shows, is that Sarbanes-Oxley merely duplicated existing law. 221 As it stands post-Scrushy, Sarbanes-Oxley accomplishes
nothing that could not have been accomplished by the enforcement of
existing law.22 2 It was already against the law for CEOs and CFOs to
knowingly perpetuate fraud within their companies.22 3 SarbanesOxley's certification requirement and mandate that CEOs and CFOs
verify that internal controls are in place were intended to ease the
government's burden of showing top executive culpability. 224 But in
the wake of Scrushy, the government's burden remains unchanged.
Richard Scrushy's written certification of HealthSouth's fraudulent financial statements and his attestation that effective internal controls
were in place amounted to nothing.22 5 The same burden that existed
prior to Sarbanes-Oxley exists after Sarbanes-Oxley.22 6
1. Exorbitant Costs of Sarbanes-Oxley
The failure to provide corporate accountability would not be considered so harmful were it not for the incredible costs associated with
Sarbanes-Oxley.2 2 7 It is estimated that American businesses spent
$6.1 billion dollars on compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley in 2005
alone. 22 8 The costs of Sarbanes-Oxley compliance are indeed troublesome, but the true overall economic impact of Sarbanes-Oxley may be
impossible to measure, as Illinois law professor Larry Ribstein
explained:
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Joseph Nocera, ForAll Its Cost, Sarbanes Law Is Working, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3,
2005, at Cl, available at 2005 WLNR 19467699.
221. Stephen Bainbridge, Shedding Light on SOX, TCS DAILY, Dec. 7, 2005, http://
www.tcsdaily.com/article.aspx?id=120705G.
222. Id.
223. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000).
224. Karmel, supra note 43.
225. See Whitmire, supra note 153.
226. See id.
227. See William Bulkeley & Charles Forelle, How Corporate Scandals Gave Tech
Firms a New Business Line, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 2005, fig. at Al.
',
228. Id.
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There is evidence that [Sarbanes-Oxley] did have an effect in causing firms to eliminate or reduce public ownership. Studies have
shown that 200 firms went dark in 2003, the year after [SarbanesOxley] was enacted, [and] that going private transactions increased
after the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley .... [Sarbanes-Oxley] may be
encouraging publicly held firms to go dark and thereby lose disclosure transparency for the benefit of insiders and to the detriment of
outside shareholders.2 29
While Sarbanes-Oxley looks to be motivating some publicly held companies to go private, it may also be discouraging some privately owned
firms from going public:
[C]ompanies are opting for financing from private-equity firms,
which are helping companies face this new world of regulatory scrutiny .... The CEO of one company that went this route said "I think
staying private versus tackling Sarbanes-Oxley head-on is something a lot of companies think about"... Sarbanes-Oxley has made
it harder for small companies to attract outsiders to sit on their
boards. [It] seems the good directors don't want to take this risk in
the [Sarbanes-Oxley] environment. . . .[S]ince going public is an
important venture capital exit strategy, partially closing the exit
could impede start-up financing, and therefore make it harder to get
ideas off the ground.23 °
It has been said that Sarbanes-Oxley has other beneficial uses aside
from the certification provisions. 231 But most of these benefits, like
the establishment of an oversight board for public accounting, merely
repeat independent audit committees already established under prior
SEC rules.23 2 Another benefit often touted is the increased budget for
the SEC under Sarbanes-Oxley, but a law as broad and costly as
Sarbanes-Oxley is hardly necessary to boost the SEC's budget.2 33 The
fact is that if the certification provisions are deemed toothless,
Sarbanes-Oxley does far more harm than good. If nothing else, the
Scrushy trial is a "pendulum swing back.., from what had become a
virtually automatic assumption in these types of proceedings that they
were indefensible. '234 The government's job will be that much more
difficult after Scrushy because it was that sense of inevitability that
prompted so many of Scrushy's former employees to become witnesses for the government.2 35 Now those former CFOs will be serving
sentences while Richard Scrushy is a free man. 236 Bill Owens, the key
229. Ribstein, supra note 10.
230. Ideoblog, http:/Ibusmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2005/03/index.html (March
31, 2005, 06:17 EST) (Larry Ribstein's blog).
231. See Nocera, supra note 220.
232. See Bainbridge, supra note 221.
233. Id.
234. Dugan, supra note 206 (internal quotation marks omitted).
235. Id.
236. Michael Tomberlin, Owens Sentenced to 5 Years in Prison, BIRMINGHAM
NEWS, Dec. 10, 2005, at Al.
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witness for the government, was sentenced to five years in prison for
his part in the financial scandal on December 9, 2005.237 Scrushy
shows us that for those with the resources, despite the intentions of
Sarbanes-Oxley, the "I didn't know" defense remains a valid option.
V.

CONCLUSION

The pitfalls of Sarbanes-Oxley are not solely to blame for the
Scrushy acquittal. This Note has detailed other valid reasons for the
not-guilty verdict. These reasons include the prosecution's decision to
try the case in Scrushy's home town, Scrushy's unusual public relations campaign, and the unique and aggressive courtroom tactics used
by Scrushy's defense. However, despite these reasons, United States v.
Scrushy still provides worthwhile insight into the overall value of
Sarbanes-Oxley. Sarbanes-Oxley was intended to strengthen corporate accountability. It was intended to dispel the "I didn't know" defense from being used successfully by corporate defendants.2 38 United
States v. Scrushy illustrates that the desire for corporate accountability
that motivated Sarbanes-Oxley's hasty passage is no better achieved
with Sarbanes-Oxley than without. United States v. Scrushy shows
that despite Sarbanes-Oxley's certification requirements, verification
of internal controls requirements, and harsh penalties, in terms of corporate accountability-nothing has changed. The "I didn't know" defense remains an effective corporate-executive defense-so effective
that Scrushy's personal certification of HealthSouth's financial records
and his attestation that proper internal controls were in place could
not overcome it. 239 The "I didn't know" defense was so effective that

the testimony of five former CFOs and incriminating tape recordings
were not enough.2 4 °
Without the benefit of corporate accountability, Sarbanes-Oxley is
rendered into an enormously expensive and burdensome drain on
business.2 4 ' It motivates public companies to go private and it discourages private companies from going public, and investors pay the
price due to the corresponding lack of transparency.2 42 Therefore, this
Note asserts that Congress should reexamine Sarbanes-Oxley. Furthermore, this Note contends that Sarbanes-Oxley should either be
drastically curtailed, or replaced altogether. In its current form, the
minimal benefits simply do not warrant its continued existence.
Walter "Trey" Stock
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id.
Clayton, supra note 150.
See Abelson, supra note 128.
See id.
See Ribstein, supra note 10.
Id. at 379.
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